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Adam Karp exclusively practices animal law statewide from Bellingham, Washington. Having graduated from Gonzaga University with a B.A. Honors, and University of Washington with a J.D. and M.S. in statistics, this is Mr. Karp's tenth year actively practicing law.
He founded and served as first chair of the new Washington State Bar Association's Animal Law Section for 2002-2003 and has held executive committee positions since its formation. He is also a vice-chair of the American Bar Association's Animal Law Committee.
In addition to serving his sixth year as a contributing editor of the Animal Legal Report, produced by Animal Legal Reports Services (www.animallegalreports.com), he is a long term member of the Animal Legal Defense Fund (www.aldf.org). Further, he was graduated from the Washington Level One Animal Control Academy and is a member of the Washington Animal Control Association and National Animal Control Association.
He regularly writes on the topic of animal law and routinely speaks around the nation about animal law, including at Yale, Harvard, Vanderbilt, and Vermont Law School. Mr. Karp is an adjunct professor of animal law at the University of Washington School of Law and Seattle University School of Law. He has been quoted in TIME magazine, the National Law Journal, the ABA Journal, and other periodicals, including a dedicated article on his practice in the Seattle Times.
He has chaired several animal law CLEs hosted by the WSBA, and has been a speaker at nearly 30 CLEs and conferences around the nation all on the subject of animal law. With positive results, he has argued before the Washington Courts of Appeal on the subject of animal law:
Mansour v. King County, (pdf) 131 Wash.App. 255 (Div. I, 2006): A published decision guaranteeing due process to dog guardians challenging orders of confinement and removal predicated on allegations of viciousness.
Wolverton v. Young, 2006 WL 165734 (Div. III, 2006), unpub.: An unpublished decision reaffirming that taxpayers have standing to challenge illegal acts of government without proving special injury apart from other taxpayers. In this case, plaintiffs reversed dismissal for lack of standing so they could challenge the alleged illegal issuance of an animal control contract.
Womack v. von Rardon, 133 Wash. App. 254 (Div. III, 2006), pub.: A published decision creating, for the first time in Washington, a cause of action for malicious injury to an animal.
Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care and Control, (pdf) 144 Wash.App. 185 (Div. III, 2008), pub.: A published decision affirming that private non-profit and for-profit businesses contracted with municipalities to provide core animal control services may be "functional equivalents" of government, thereby
subject to the Public Disclosure Act.
Sherman v. Kissinger, (pdf) 146 Wash.App. 855 (Div. I, 2008), pub.: A published decision holding that Washington's medical malpractice statute, chapter 7.70 RCW, does not apply to lawsuits involving allegations of malpractice by veterinarians. Although one might assume that applying a human health
statute to veterinarians would be a good thing for animals and their guardians, in fact, the opposite is true. Chapter 7.70 establishes a number of impediments to malpractice suits, including mandatory mediation, a shorter statute of limitations, and the elimination of alternative causes of action, many of which are relied on by animal law practitioners to enhance claims on behalf of animal guardians. Sherman also argued that her dog, Ruby, was a unique individual who was irreplaceable; the only way to even approach adequately compensating Sherman was to give her the special value that she placed on the dog, also known as "intrinsic value." The defendants' position, which was supported by an amicus brief from pet industry organizations including the American Kennel Club, was that Sherman
was only entitled to the market value of Ruby, an amount of $100-$200. The court held, importantly, that the question of an animal's value is one for the jury and not, in ordinary circumstances, one to be determined by a judge in a pretrial motion. Lastly, the court confirmed that emotional distress damages are recoverable when a person intentionally causes injury or death to a companion animal.
Adam, 36, is married to a wonderful woman.
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